COMMENTS

In Search of Ordinary Meaning: What Can Be
Learned from the Textualist Opinions of
Bostock v. Clayton County?
Sam Capparelli†
In Bostock v. Clayton County, the Supreme Court held that Title VII protects
gay and transgender individuals from employment discrimination. Writing for the
majority, Justice Neil Gorsuch adhered to textualist principles and relied on the ordinary public meaning of the phrase “discriminate because of sex.” Despite the majority opinion purportedly not reaching beyond the words of the statute, three other
conservatives on the Court accused Justice Gorsuch of legislating from the bench.
Central to this Comment, Justice Brett Kavanaugh took exception with how Justice
Gorsuch reached his ordinary meaning of the phrase. The debate between these two
Justices can be characterized as a debate between semantics and pragmatics—two
schools within the field of linguistics. Justice Gorsuch’s stringing together the
precedent-defined meaning of the individual terms of the statute resembled semantics. Justice Kavanaugh’s reliance on considering the phrase as a whole and an examination of the broader societal and historical context resembled pragmatics.
This Comment proposes a sliding-scale approach that indicates when to move
between semantics and pragmatics. What makes the scale slide is the pool of precedent, or the variability in how courts and their precedent have defined the words of
a phrase. As the pool of precedent increases, the need to support a semantics-derived
meaning of the phrase with pragmatics increases. To create a proxy for the variability of precedent-defined words, this Comment creates a tiered structure based on our
court system’s hierarchy of precedent. By adopting this sliding-scale approach,
courts will be able to interpret statutes while supporting textualism’s goal of judicial
restraint.
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INTRODUCTION
What is the meaning of the phrase “discriminate because of
sex”? This was the key question the Supreme Court faced in Bostock v. Clayton County.1 The case involved the firing of two gay
individuals and one transgender individual, and the Court’s answer to the question solidified Title VII’s protections to gay and
transgender individuals against employment discrimination. No
longer can an employer fire an individual for being gay or
transgender.2

1
2

140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
Id. at 1754.
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To reach this determination, Justice Neil Gorsuch’s majority
opinion utilized the principles of textualism. Like any good textualist, Justice Gorsuch relied on the ordinary public meaning of
the statute and refused to consider extratextual sources—such as
legislative history—when the express terms of the statute gave
the Court “one answer.”3 To reach his one answer, Justice Gorsuch
started with dictionary definitions of individual words in a
phrase, supported these definitions with the help of precedent,
and then combined the meanings of the individual words to find
the ordinary meaning of the phrase. The result is that Title VII’s
use of the phrase “discriminate because of sex”4 means that “[a]n
employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual based in part on sex.”5 Using this definition of the phrase, Justice Gorsuch concluded that Title VII protects individuals from discrimination based on their sexual orientation and gender identity.6
But Justice Gorsuch is not the only textualist on the highest
court in the land. Justice Brett Kavanaugh, in dissent, agreed
that the Court needed to look to the ordinary meaning of “discriminate because of sex” but disagreed with how the majority reached
its one answer. While it may be literally true that the phrase
could encompass sexual-orientation or gender-identity discrimination, Justice Kavanaugh contended that the majority’s reading
of the statute did not comport with its ordinary meaning.7 Ordinary public meaning is the “conventional meaning of the utterance [ ] understood by ordinary but linguistically proficient
speakers at the time of the utterance.”8 Justice Kavanaugh argued that when the majority relied on the “strung-together definitions of the individual words in the phrase,” it committed itself
to the literal meaning of the phrase.9 The majority’s process of
stringing together dictionary definitions to reach the ordinary
meaning of a phrase is similar to what linguists call semantics.
In semantics, “meanings of parts compositionally determine the
meanings of wholes.”10 This is not how mainstream textualists

3

Id. at 1737.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
5
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (emphasis added).
6
Id. at 1743.
7
Id. at 1824–25 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
8
Ash McMurray, Semantic Originalism, Moral Kinds, and the Meaning of the Constitution, 2018 BYU L. REV. 695, 711 (2018).
9
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
10 Korta Kepa & John Perry, Pragmatics, in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2020), https://perma.cc/BDQ9-YSRV.
4
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determine ordinary meaning. It “misses the forest for the trees.”11
Instead, a judge should assess the “ordinary meaning of the
phrase as a whole.”12 This process is similar to what linguists call
pragmatics. Pragmatics is “sometimes characterized as dealing
with the effects of context.”13
Textualism has become a common denominator among Supreme Court Justices, but there is disagreement over what it
means to be a textualist.14 Textualism started as a methodology
that only conservative judges employed. Since Justice Antonin
Scalia joined the Court, the textualist movement has grown, now
permeating the circuit courts. Textualism has escaped ideological
boundaries and become routine in judicial arguments—regardless of political bent. For example, Justice Elena Kagan has remarked, “[W]e’re all textualists now.”15 However, Bostock indicates that textualism is not a clearly defined philosophy. Justices
Gorsuch and Kavanaugh both subscribe to textualism, both claim
to adhere to the text of Title VII, and both argue that the other is
attempting to subvert the role of the legislature. Although Justice
Gorsuch’s reliance on solely the words of the statute was the first
step in being a good textualist, his reliance on semantics to find
the ordinary meaning of a phrase diverged from mainstream textualism. Prominent textualists have denounced the stringing together of definitions as dealing in “a sterile literalism.”16 Despite
such an expressed preference for pragmatics textualism, case law
and empirical evidence may provide some support for Justice
Gorsuch’s approach. As textualism has become more popular, the
use of dictionaries and the stringing together of definitions has
increased, suggesting that mainstream textualist judges often
stray from pragmatics textualism. These judges do not practice
what they preach.
The problem with straying from a pragmatics textualism in
favor of semantics textualism is that a “phrase may have a more
precise or confined meaning than” the semantic meaning.17 This

11

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Bostock, 140 S. Ct at 1826 (emphasis in original).
13 Kepa & Perry, supra note 10 (emphasis in original).
14 The 2015 Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Elena Kagan on the Reading of
Statutes, HARV. L. TODAY at 8:29 (Nov. 17, 2015), https://perma.cc/APM3-Y9EU.
15 Id.
16 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 356 (2012) (quoting N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 68 F.2d 19, 20 (2d Cir. 1933)).
17
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also FCC v. AT&T Inc.,
562 U.S. 397, 406 (2011).
12
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more precise meaning comes from context. Context can be derived
from knowing when a statement is made or who made the statement.18 Important to this Comment, a specific combination of
words can also provide relevant societal context. For example,
Chief Justice John Roberts has written that “two words together
may assume a more particular meaning than those words in isolation. We understand a golden cup to be a cup made of or resembling gold. A golden boy, on the other hand, is one who is charming, lucky, and talented.”19
Bostock also shows that textualism’s lack of clearly defined
requirements has consequences. Because Justice Gorsuch’s approach to textualism won the day, gay and transgender people
enjoy the benefits of Title VII protection—benefits that Justice
Kavanaugh argues should have come from the legislature. Although
Justice Gorsuch won the battle, will Justice Kavanaugh win the
war? It is possible that this case will represent the genesis of two
branches of textualism. Instead of a unified theory of textualism,
judges will either adhere to the semantics or pragmatics school of
textualism. It is equally possible that one of these two theories
will fall by the wayside.
Bearing in mind the importance of defining what it means to
be a textualist, this Comment offers a sliding-scale approach that
reconciles Justice Gorsuch’s semantics approach with Justice
Kavanaugh’s pragmatics approach. The size of the pool of precedent is the primary variable that dictates the extent to which a
judge uses a semantics or pragmatics approach. This sliding-scale
approach assesses the pool of available precedent to determine
whether a judge can rely solely on semantics textualism to develop the ordinary meaning of a phrase. A judge should use semantics to construct a phrase with definitions derived from precedent. I call this a precedent-based-semantics approach. When
there is variance in how precedent has defined the individual
words of the phrase (i.e., the pool is large), it becomes necessary to
support the precedent-based-semantics meaning with pragmaticsbased arguments. Relying on a judge’s determination of the variability of the precedent creates a new concern. Judges who like
the precedent-based-semantics meaning will say the pool of
Kepa & Perry, supra note 10.
AT&T, 562 U.S. at 406. Judge Learned Hand expressed a similar belief, albeit in
a more fanciful manner, when he wrote that “the meaning of a sentence may be more than
that of the separate words, as a melody is more than the notes.” Helvering v. Gregory, 69
F.2d 809, 810–11 (2d Cir. 1934).
18
19

1424

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

precedent is small, and judges who do not like the precedentbased-semantics meaning will say the pool of precedent is large.
To assuage this concern, I construct tiers that approximate the
pool of precedent. The two factors that go into this approximation
for the pool of precedent are (1) the court that created the precedent and (2) the statute that the precedent interpreted—similar
to how the U.S. court system already approaches precedent.
In Bostock, Justice Gorsuch correctly relied on an entirely
precedent-based-semantics approach because the pool of Supreme Court precedent interpreting the words of Title VII is adequately small. In contrast, when the pool of precedent is large, the
need to support a precedent-based-semantics meaning with pragmatics comes into play. For instance, had Justice Gorsuch looked
to how the Supreme Court defined words in other statutes to determine the ordinary meaning of the words of Title VII, he would
have needed to address whether this meaning makes sense in the
context of Title VII. The Supreme Court has likely considered the
term “because of” many times and produced a variety of potential
definitions. Therefore, Justice Gorsuch would have had to support
his selection of one of the potential definitions with an examination of context. This context could be an examination of the rest of
the statute: Does Bostock’s interpretation of the word “sex” also
make sense in Title IX? Or this context could be an examination of
historical or societal context: Does Bostock’s use of the word “sex”
make sense with how normal people used it in 1964? Had Justice
Gorsuch looked to how lower courts or state courts defined the
words to determine the ordinary meaning of the words of Title VII,
the sliding-scale approach would call for both forms of context.
My sliding-scale approach advances a new middle ground between absolute semantics and absolute pragmatics. I argue this
middle ground is preferable to the absolutes because of its ability
to eliminate value-based judgments. Eliminating value-based
judgments is the stated goal of textualists because it increases the
predictability of statutory interpretation, which in turn promotes
the rule of law and democratic accountability.
The sliding-scale approach’s ability to limit value-based judgments is premised on two considerations: the benefits to predictability from statutory stare decisis and the relatively limited ability to cherry-pick terms defined in precedent. Statutory stare
decisis is the accepted, strong presumption that a court’s precedent related to statutory interpretation is correct. Unlike constitutional stare decisis, there is general acceptance of statutory
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stare decisis even among textualists.20 Creating predictable law
and promoting judicial restraint are two rationales supporting
statutory stare decisis21—similar rationales for textualism.22
Cherry-picking occurs when there is an abundance of options to
make an argument, allowing a judge to choose the option that best
comports with her value preferences. If there is an abundance of
precedent defining the same words in different ways, then a precedent-based-semantics approach allows for cherry-picking. This
problem also arises with the use of dictionaries. There are enough
dictionaries—and dictionary definitions—that, by picking among
the plethora of options, a judge could find support for almost any
possible argument. My sliding-scale approach seeks to restrain
judges by limiting the ability to cherry-pick. To avoid cherry-picking, pragmatics comes in to check the precedent-based-semantics
meaning, limiting precedents’ ability to support value-based judgments. But to fully utilize precedent, semantics must play a role.
In developing my argument for the sliding-scale approach, I offer
an analysis of how textualists have approached semantics and
whether the Court has tacitly recognized a distinction between
dictionary-defined terms and precedent-defined terms.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an
overview of textualism, including its history and how it relates to
the Bostock opinion. Part I.A surveys “New Textualist” thought.
These are the tenets about which there is little disagreement
among textualists. Part I.B then looks outside of Bostock and
briefly describes other methods that textualists have used to find
ordinary meaning. Part II examines the major disagreement
within the textualist methodology relevant to Bostock: the proper
role of semantics. To that effect, Part II.A and Part II.B provide
an in-depth analysis of the Bostock case, focusing on Justice
Gorsuch’s majority opinion and Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent. After framing the debate between Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh
as one of semantics versus pragmatics, Part II.C explores the

20 See Amy Coney Barrett, Statutory Stare Decisis in the Courts of Appeals, 73 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 317, 326 (2005). But see Anita S. Krishnakumar, Textualism and Statutory
Precedents, 104 VA. L. REV. 157, 163–65 (2018) (noting that textualist judges have been
willing to ignore statutory stare decisis).
21 See Barrett, supra note 20, at 325–27.
22 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., INTERPRETING LAW: A PRIMER ON HOW TO READ
STATUTES AND THE CONSTITUTION 81 (2016) (“[Textualism] helps judges create a predictable and objective rule of law, enjoys great legitimacy because it is faithful to the premises
of the legislative drafting process, and is the most reliable way to carry out the great plans
to which legislators have committed our society.”).
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validity of a precedent-based-semantics approach. Left without a
clear answer between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh,
Part III uses the guidepost of restraining judges to examine the
method that textualists ought to embrace. Part III.A presents a
novel sliding-scale approach that incorporates a precedent-basedsemantics approach similar to Justice Gorsuch’s approach in
Bostock, but it also gives credence to Justice Kavanaugh’s arguments in support of a pragmatics-based approach. Part III.B provides further justifications in support of the sliding-scale approach. Part III.C addresses the counterarguments that arise
from relying on alternative methods when there is a truly novel
statute. Finally, Part III.D uses the concept of judicial restraint
to critique the alternative methods introduced in Part I.B.
I. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK: WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO BE A
TEXTUALIST?
There are parts of the textualist theory that share universal
agreement among textualist judges, and there are parts that
leave room for debate. To establish a baseline for what it means
to be a textualist, Part I.A lays out the concepts that unite all
practitioners of “New Textualism”—a form of textualism that refuses to look to legislative history. Part I.B introduces the methods
that have been suggested by commentators on textualism for finding ordinary meaning.
A. New Textualism
Despite their differing opinions in Bostock, Justice Gorsuch,
Justice Kavanaugh, and Justice Samuel Alito all purport to subscribe to a form of textualism known as New Textualism.23 Justice
Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook popularized this interpretive methodology, and both made efforts to clearly articulate its
foundational elements.24 Central to New Textualism is the goal
for a judge to be a “faithful agent” of Congress—“when a statutory

23 See Andrew Koppelman, Bostock, LGBT Discrimination, and the Subtractive
Moves, 105 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 1, 6 (2020). The difference between old textualism
and New Textualism is the consideration of legislative history. New Textualism rarely, if
ever, consults legislative history, while old textualism sees it as an important part of confirming or finding statutory meaning. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism and
Normative Canons, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 531, 532–33 (2013) (reviewing SCALIA & GARNER,
supra note 16).
24 See generally SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16; Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of
Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59 (1987).
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text is clear, that is the end of the matter.”25 This method contravenes the beliefs of purposivists who “maintain that judges are
partners in governance and ought to consider that role when they
apply statutes to new circumstances.”26 The goal of New Textualism explains why the majority in Bostock stressed that it was
simply following the law that the legislature established in the
text and why the dissents claimed that the majority was improperly legislating. To take part in any lawmaking is anathema to a
textualist’s goal of being a faithful agent of Congress. Instead, a
textualist operating as a faithful agent wants to remain constrained to the text, limiting a judge’s ability to read her own values into a statute.27 Keeping the judge’s values out of a statute
“provide[s] greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predictability and greater respect for the rule of law.”28
In pursuit of being faithful agents, textualists have examined
government behavior to further the argument that a judge should
not move past a clear text. Textualists “maintain . . . that variance between a clear text and its apparent purpose does not show
that Congress . . . poorly communicated its intent.”29 Instead, textualists abstain from using purpose to impute intent, offering
three arguments that aim to show that the text is the best reflection of the legislature’s desires.30 First, the effect of compromising
multiple interests to form the text of a statute means that legislators may not “pursue a statute’s background purpose to its logical
end.”31 Promoting the ultimate purpose over the text of a statute
ignores that the text represents what Congress could get passed
through the legislative process.32 Second, textualists contend that
it is nearly impossible to construct a collective intent from the aggregate of legislators’ individual preferences because “legislative
outcomes frequently turn on non-substantive factors, such as the
sequence of alternatives presented (agenda manipulation) or the
practice of strategic voting (logrolling).”33 Similar to the first
25

John F. Manning, Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 7 (2001).
Eskridge, supra note 23, at 532.
27 Id. at 532–33.
28 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at xxix.
29 Manning, supra note 25, at 7.
30 Purpose can be said to be the “general aim,” and intent approximates the meaning
and the “particularized application which the statute was ‘intended’ to be given.” Archibald
Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 HARV. L. REV. 370, 370–
71 (1947).
31 Manning, supra note 25, at 7.
32 Id. at 18.
33 Id. at 19.
26
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point, pursuing the purpose of a law at the expense of the text
ignores political realities, and because the text of a law is not dependent only on purpose but also on strategic behavior, making
this tradeoff calls into question a judge’s ability to impute legislative intent when interpreting a statute.34 Third, enforcing purpose
and not text may undermine Congress’s desire to use a rule rather
than a standard to achieve its goals.35 As Justice Scalia put it,
judges “are bound, not only by the ultimate purposes Congress
has selected, but by the means it has deemed appropriate, and
prescribed, for the pursuit of those purposes.”36 Therefore, if a
judge pursues purpose over text, then that judge may be undermining the legislature’s desire to restrict the means that a judge
can use to accomplish the goals of a statute. These arguments
show that purpose-based arguments impute ‘“intent’ that ultimately can be found only in the mind of the judge.”37
Textualists are left with the words in the statute and its surrounding context to determine the dictates of a particular law.
Judge Easterbrook favorably quotes Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., proclaiming that “Holmes could say in 1899 that ‘We
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the
statute means.’ He was denying that original intent, as opposed
to the original meaning, mattered.”38 Accordingly, textualists do
not rely on external forms of evidence that serve to illuminate the
purpose of the statute—namely, legislative history.39
A final point of agreement is that textualists do not rely on
the literal meaning of the text but rather the ordinary meaning.
This point is seemingly the center of Justice Kavanaugh’s main
argument. Justice Gorsuch’s “one answer” for the text may be literally correct, but it is substituting out ordinary meaning in favor
of literal meaning.40 This is a problem if Justice Gorsuch is truly
practicing textualism. Textualists have been clear that literalism
is not the way to determine the meaning of the statute.41 The

34

Id.
Id. at 20.
36 MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 231 n.4 (2001).
37 Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 66.
38 Id. at 61 (quoting Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Legal Interpretation,
12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (1899), reprinted in OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 203, 207 (1920)).
39 Eskridge, supra note 23, at 532.
40 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
41 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW 24 (1997) (“[T]he good textualist is not a literalist.”); Caleb Nelson, What Is
35
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proper way for a textualist to interpret statutes is to ask “how a
reasonable person, conversant with the relevant social and linguistic conventions, would read the text in context.”42 Successfully
engaging in this exercise allows one to determine the ordinary
meaning of a phrase. The ordinary meaning of the phrase is important because it is (by definition) the “most accessible to the
citizenry desirous of following the law.”43 “This approach recognizes that the literal or dictionary definitions of words will often
fail to account for settled nuances or background conventions that
qualify the literal meaning of language.”44 When a judge deviates
from the ordinary meaning in favor of the literal meaning, she
abandons what most people think the law means, “depriv[ing] the
citizenry of fair notice of what the law is.”45
New Textualists agree that judges should rely on the ordinary meaning of statutory test, but they disagree on the appropriate methods to find it. “Textualists believe that legislation supposes that legislators and judges are part of a common social and
linguistic community, with shared conventions for communication. Accordingly, they argue that a faithful agent’s job is to decode legislative instructions according to the common social and
linguistic conventions shared by the relevant community.”46 However, there is no consensus on how to discern these social and linguistic conventions. Justice Scalia suggested using “valid canons”
of statutory interpretation.47 In Bostock, Justice Gorsuch focused
on precedent and the dictionary.48 This approach contrasted with
Justices Kavanaugh and Alito’s consideration of the history surrounding Title VII, common parlance, and how government entities have used the words elsewhere.49 Judge Easterbrook has a
similar approach to Justices Kavanaugh and Alito, adhering to
common parlance. Judge Easterbrook argues that the meaning
should be derived from how an objectively reasonable person

Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 376 (2005) (“[N]o mainstream judge is interested solely
in the literal definitions of a statute’s words.”).
42 John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2392–93 (2005).
43 ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 81.
44 Manning, supra note 42, at 2393. For an empirical study on the truth of this statement, see Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L. REV. 726, 771 (2020)
(finding that dictionary definitions can reflect extensive uses).
45 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
46 Manning, supra note 25, at 16.
47 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 9.
48 See infra Part II.A.
49 See infra Part II.B–C.
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would read the words.50 In practice, judges have not declared a
clear winner.51
B. Alternative Methods for Finding Ordinary Meaning
Among textualist judges, some have explicitly offered methods
to determine the ordinary meaning of phrases. The purpose of this
Section is to briefly introduce these methods. The shortcomings
of these methods will then be discussed in Part III.D.
1. Justice Kavanaugh’s “best reading” approach.
Justice Kavanaugh has offered what he calls the “best reading” approach.52 The first step in the best-reading approach is to
abandon the threshold determination of ambiguity.53 Other interpretative methods—and some practitioners of textualism—require judges to find the text ambiguous before using extratextual
sources or canons of interpretation. Justice Kavanaugh asserts
that these ambiguity thresholds create an opportunity for value
judgments to creep into a decision.54 Judge Easterbrook has expressed a similar reluctance to rely on ambiguity thresholds. The
problem is that an ambiguity determination is unlikely to restrain because the court is the one that gets to “choose when to
declare the language of the statute ‘ambiguous,’” as “[t]here is no
metric for clarity.”55 This lack of an objective standard allows a
political or subjective determination as to whether to move past

50 See Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 65 (“The meaning of statutes is to be found not
in the subjective, multiple mind of Congress but in the understanding of the objectively
reasonable person.”).
51 See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier & Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The
United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 MARQ.
L. REV. 77, 84–92 (2010) (tracking the increasing usage of dictionaries of Supreme Court
Justices); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 415–24 (arguing that dictionaries may not
solve every interpretative problem and providing dictionary recommendations); Manning,
supra note 42, at 2458–59 (noting that dictionaries may be applicable but should be consulted only after narrowing the pool of definitions through an examination of context);
Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265, 279–85 (2020) (describing
the divide between “formalistic textualism” and “flexible textualism”).
52 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2144 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
53 See id.
54 See id. at 2138–39 (citing Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior & Anup Malani,
Ambiguity About Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J. LEGAL
ANALYSIS 257, 290 (2010)).
55 Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 62; see also Kavanaugh, supra note 52, at 2136–37.
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the text.56 This apparent problem can be seen between Bostock’s
majority opinion and Justice Alito’s dissent. Justice Gorsuch
states that the “express terms of [the] statute give [the Court] one
answer.”57 Justice Alito finds this argument arrogant and considers unambiguity to be a high standard.58 These statements do little to move the ball. Which side a reader comes down on is less
likely to be tied to how ambiguous the text is than the values or
purposes promoted in each opinion.
Justice Kavanaugh argues that a court should instead rely
on “(1) the words themselves, (2) the context of the whole statute,
and (3) any other applicable semantic canons.”59 Justice Kavanaugh
defines semantic canons as “the general rules by which we understand the English language.”60 Ultimately, these steps amount to
the equivalent of finding the literal meaning of the statute.61
Then, a judge should “apply—openly and honestly—any substantive canons (such as plain statement rules or the absurdity doctrine)
that may justify departure from the text.”62 Justice Kavanaugh focuses on the absurdity doctrine,63 which will be discussed further
in Part III.D.
2. Justice Scalia’s valid-canons approach.
Justice Scalia has spoken in vague terms of using context but
has presented a list of interpretative canons to maintain predictability. Textualists have consistently said context is important to
determine the meaning of a statute, and to determine the appropriate context, a judge “should look at the statutory structure and
hear the words as they would sound in the mind of a skilled, objectively reasonable user of words.”64 Justice Scalia has promoted
the same idea of utilizing a reasonableness inquiry: “[T]he acid
56 See Saul Levmore, Ambiguous Statutes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073, 1077–78 (2010);
Farnsworth et al., supra note 54, at 290.
57 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
58 Id. at 1757, 1763 (Alito, J., dissenting). In another context, Justice Scalia disagrees
with unambiguity being a high standard. See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 520–21 (1989).
59 Kavanaugh, supra note 52, at 2145.
60 Id.
61 See id. at 2150 (“In a world without initial determinations of ambiguity, judges
would instead decide on the best reading of the statute. In that world, legislative history
would be largely limited to helping answer the question of whether the literal reading of
the statute produces an absurdity.”).
62 Id. at 2144.
63 See id. at 2156–59.
64 Easterbrook, supra note 24, at 65.
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test of whether a word [or phrase] can reasonably bear a particular meaning is whether you could use the word [or phrase] in that
sense at a cocktail party without having people look at you
funny.”65 However, an abstract determination of what is reasonable is not a limiting guideline. Fortunately, Justice Scalia has provided some greater insight as to what can be used to determine
when cocktail-party attendees will look at you funny.66 Unfortunately, this insight has come in the form of fifty-seven interpretive canons, undermining the restraining power that textualism
seeks to promote.67
3. Corpus linguistics.
Corpus linguistics represents a modern approach to finding
ordinary meaning. Utah Supreme Court Associate Chief Justice
Thomas Lee and Professor Stephen Mouritsen write that when
finding ordinary meaning “we are asking an empirical question—
about the sense of a word or phrase that is most likely implicated
in a given linguistic context.”68 Considering the empirical nature
of the question, they propose that it is best determined through a
data-driven approach called corpus linguistics.69 This process
looks for patterns of meaning or usage in “corpora” (i.e., large databases of naturally occurring language).70 Through their analysis, Chief Justice Lee and Mouritsen seek to define ordinary
meaning and often consider it with respect to the “relative frequency of competing senses of a given term.”71 The level of frequency that equates to ordinary meaning is not answered.72 Still,
a judge that relies on corpus linguistics has the tools to find the
frequency of competing senses, accounting for “relevant semantic,
pragmatic, temporal, and speech-community considerations.”73
Seemingly, corpus linguistics serves as an effective method for a

65

Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See generally Scalia & Garner, supra note 16.
67 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 534, 540–41. For a discussion of why this is unfortunate, see infra Part III.D.
68 Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE
L.J. 788, 795 (2018).
69 See id. at 828–29.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 829.
72 See id. at 800–02 (noting the different definitions of ordinary meaning employed
by courts).
73 Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 68, at 828.
66
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textualist to consider all the potential factors that would allow
her to find ordinary meaning.
II. BOSTOCK V. CLAYTON COUNTY: PICKING BETWEEN
SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS
In Bostock, the Supreme Court held that Title VII protects
gay and transgender people from employment discrimination.74
To reach this result, the Court engaged in a two-step process:
(1) Find the ordinary meaning of the operative phrase and (2) apply the ordinary meaning to the facts of the case. At step one, the
majority found the “express terms of [the] statute” provided “one
answer.”75 It was therefore inappropriate to apply “extratextual
considerations.”76 If the Court did rely on extratextual considerations, it would be going beyond a court’s requirement to apply the
language of the law and would abandon the practice of judicial
humility.77 Accordingly, the rule that emerged from the ordinary
meaning of the phrase “discriminate because of sex” was that
“[a]n employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.”78 At the second step, the
Court stated that “[a]n employer who fires an individual for being
homosexual or transgender fires that person for traits or actions
it would not have questioned in members of a different sex.”79
Consequently, discrimination because of sexual orientation or
gender identity falls under Title VII’s prohibitions against discrimination because of sex.80 However, Justice Kavanaugh’s dissenting opinion suggested that the majority’s purposeful ignorance of some extratextual considerations—particularly the
societal context of Title VII—means that the majority opinion is
not aligned with the ordinary public meaning that it claims to
represent.81 By ignoring the societal context, Justice Gorsuch
committed himself to the literal meaning of the phrase. The problem with using the literal meaning is twofold: First, it is well established that textualists do not rely on the literal meaning of a
statute.82 Second—and more fundamental—the majority’s
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1743.
Id. at 1737.
Id.
Id. at 1753.
Id. at 1741.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737.
See id. at 1743.
See id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1755 (Alito, J., dissenting).
See id. at 1825 (citing Scalia, supra note 41, at 24).
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decision to rely on the literal meaning of the statute allows the
Court to legislate from the bench.83
But the distinction between literal and ordinary meaning is
not the issue in this case.84 Justice Gorsuch was explicit that his
goal was to find the “ordinary public meaning of [the statute’s]
terms at the time of its enactment.”85 In pursuit of ordinary meaning, Justice Gorsuch referred to dictionary definitions of the
words “sex,” “discriminate,” and “individual.”86 We can assume
the dictionary definitions for these terms are aligned with their
ordinary meaning because the Court sided with the plaintiffs but
used a definition of “sex” the defendants provided, and there was
no dispute over the definitions for “individual” or “discriminate.”
Moreover, Justice Gorsuch did not rely solely on dictionaries. He
also pieced together these definitions with precedent, such as the
Court saying that “the ordinary meaning of ‘because of’ is ‘by reason of’ or ‘on account of.’” 87 The real debate was whether it was
appropriate to rely on semantics when attempting to find the ordinary meaning of the statute.88
This Part aims to weigh in on the semantics versus pragmatics debate. To do so, I first provide more depth to the debate between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh. In that vein,
Part II.A summarizes Justice Gorsuch’s opinion. Part II.B summarizes Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion, highlighting how it is in
fact an argument against the use of semantics to define the ordinary meaning of a phrase. Part II.C.1 adds to the textualist literature by focusing on the extent to which semantics is out of step
with textualism. Finally, Part II.C.2 accepts that textualists express a general reluctance to rely on semantic reasoning but
makes a novel contribution to textualist literature through a descriptive analysis of how textualists on the Supreme Court have
relied on a precedent-based-semantics approach.
A. Justice Gorsuch’s Opinion
Justice Gorsuch started the majority opinion by stating that
the Court’s process for statutory interpretation is to “interpret[ ]

83

See id. at 1761 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1836–37 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
See infra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.
85 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
86 See id. at 1739–41.
87 See id. at 1739 (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350
(2013)) (quotation marks omitted).
88 See infra notes 116–20 and accompanying text.
84
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a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms
at the time of its enactment.”89 The Court, therefore, must determine the ordinary public meaning of Title VII’s command that it
is “unlawful . . . for an employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin.”90 The focus of the case was
whether sexual orientation and gender identity fall under the
statutorily protected characteristic of sex.91 However, both parties
agreed, and the Court assumed, that “sex” refers “only to biological distinctions between male and female.”92 Justice Gorsuch was
still left with the important task of defining and relating three
other parts of the statute: (1) the phrase “because of,” (2) the word
“discriminate,” and (3) the word “individual.”93
Justice Gorsuch determined that the definitions of these
words and phrases through different means but ultimately concludes that these parts interact to make a straightforward rule.
For the phrase “because of,” Justice Gorsuch relied on precedent
providing that Title VII’s “because of” test is the traditional
standard of but-for causation.94 According to Justice Gorsuch, a
“but-for test directs [the Court] to change one thing at a time and
see if the outcome changes. If it does, [the Court has] found a butfor cause.”95 This test is considered “sweeping” and allows for multiple but-for causes.96
However, the word “discriminate” serves to limit the application of the but-for test. Dictionaries and precedent related to how
the Court has decided “disparate treatment” cases—the same
type of case as Bostock—were considered authoritative. In these
cases, the Court has held that Title VII’s use of the word “discriminate” means intentionally “treating [an] individual worse than
others who are similarly situated.”97 Applying this definition to

89

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
91 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739 (“The only statutorily protected characteristic at issue
in today’s cases is ‘sex.’”).
92 Id.
93 See id. at 1739–41.
94 Id. (citing Nassar, 570 U.S. at 346).
95 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1739.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 1740 (first citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 59
(2006); and then citing Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 986 (1988)).
90
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the case at hand, Justice Gorsuch concluded that “an employer
who intentionally treats a person worse because of sex—such as
by firing the person for actions or attributes it would tolerate in
an individual of another sex—discriminates against that person
in violation of Title VII.”98 Justice Gorsuch briefly entertained an
alternative definition for “discriminate” offered in Justice Alito’s
dissent that would have the statute “require [the Court] to consider the employer’s treatment of groups rather than individuals,” creating a law that “concerns itself simply with ensuring that
employers don’t treat women generally less favorably than they
do men.”99 This alternative was quickly dismissed because of the
word “individual.” The statute “tells [the Court] three times . . .
that [the Court’s] focus should be on individuals, not groups.”100
Having completed the final step of interpretation, Justice Gorsuch
determined that a “straightforward rule emerges: An employer
violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.”101
The ordinary meaning of “discriminate because of sex” and
the emergent rule need to be applied to the case; there still needs
to be a determination whether discrimination because of sexual
orientation or gender identity constitutes a case of but-for discrimination based on sex. Because “it is impossible to discriminate against a person for being homosexual or transgender without discriminating against that individual based on sex,”
discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity is,
in fact, a form of sex discrimination.102 In other words, the reason
that discrimination because of sexual orientation or gender identity is a form of sex discrimination is because both sexual orientation and gender identity are “inextricably bound up with sex.”103
For example, firing a male employee for being gay is sex discrimination because the employer is firing the employee for being attracted to men, something that would not lead to a female employee being fired.104 This difference in treatment based on sex
shows that sex is a but-for cause of the employer firing the employee and supports the conclusion that the employer violated
Title VII.
98
99
100
101
102
103
104

Id. at 1740.
Id.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740.
Id. at 1741.
Id.
Id. at 1742.
Id. at 1741.
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B. Justice Kavanaugh’s Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kavanaugh accepted the majority’s premise that
“firing someone because of their sexual orientation may, as a very
literal matter, entail making a distinction based on sex,” but rejected that the Court must adhere to this literal meaning.105 Justice Kavanaugh stated that there is “no serious debate about the
foundational interpretive principle that courts adhere to ordinary
meaning, not literal meaning, when interpreting statutes.”106 Two
purposes motivate adhering to the ordinary rather than literal
meaning of statutory texts: the promotion of the rule of law and
democratic accountability.107 The ordinary meaning is “most accessible to the citizenry desirous of following the law,”108 and to
abandon the ordinary meaning for the literal meaning “deprives
the citizenry of fair notice of what the law is.”109 This undermines
the rule of law because “[a] society governed by the rule of law
must have laws that are known and understandable to the citizenry.”110 Ordinary meaning is also most accessible to legislators,
and departing from the ordinary meaning makes it more difficult
for legislators to understand the meaning of the laws they enact.111 And in order to have democratic accountability, “[c]itizens
and legislators must be able to ascertain the law by reading the
words of the statute.”112 Therefore, relying on the “hidden or obscure [literal] interpretation of the law, and not its ordinary
meaning,” causes the rule of law and democratic accountability to
suffer.113
The problem with Justice Kavanaugh’s emphasis on distinguishing between literal and ordinary meaning is that Justice
Gorsuch agreed with the premise that ordinary meaning trumps
literal meaning. The majority opinion explicitly stated that the
Court should normally interpret a statute “in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment.”114

105

Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1824–25 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1825; see also Manning, supra note 42, 2392–93; Robertson v. Salomon, 130
U.S. 412, 414 (1889); Milner v. Dep’t of Navy, 562 U.S. 562, 577–78 (2011).
107 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1825 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also ESKRIDGE, supra
note 22, at 81; SCALIA, supra note 41, at 17.
108 ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 81.
109 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
110 Id. at 1825.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id.
114 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738 (majority opinion).
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The majority agreed with Justice Kavanaugh that departing from
the ordinary meaning of a statute undermines the legislative process and people’s reliance on a meaning of the law that “they have
counted on to settle their rights and obligations.” 115 If Justice
Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh both agreed that statutory text
should be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning rather
than its literal meaning, what is the dispute really about?
The real disagreement is about Justice Gorsuch’s methodology for finding the ordinary meaning of a phrase, and it is this
that allegedly commits him to a literalist approach. It may be true
that there is no difference between the ordinary and literal meaning of the word “sex.” But there may be a difference between the
ordinary and literal meaning of the phrase “discriminate because
of sex.” Justice Kavanaugh’s claim was that Justice Gorsuch’s
stringing together of the separate meanings of “discriminate,”
“because of,” “individual,” and “sex” is not the proper approach to
determine the ordinary meaning of the phrase.116 To borrow from
linguistics, Justice Gorsuch was engaging in something similar to
semantics. Semantics is a logic-based approach to determining
the meaning of a phrase. One must know only the meaning of the
individual words of a phrase and the rules of syntax to determine
the meaning of a phrase.117 After selecting what he considered to
be the appropriate meaning for each word in the statutory phrase,
Justice Gorsuch added them all together to define the meaning of
the phrase.118 Justice Kavanaugh argued this is the incorrect approach. Instead, the unit of analysis to determine the ordinary
meaning of a phrase should be the entire phrase and should rely
on the context specific to that phrase.119 Linguists might treat this
method of interpretation as closer to pragmatics. The problem
with straying from pragmatics in favor of semantics is that a
“phrase may have a more precise or confined meaning than the”
semantic meaning.120 When courts ignore this fact, they “miss[ ]
the forest for the trees.”121
After rejecting Justice Gorsuch’s approach to discerning the
ordinary meaning of the phrase “discriminate because of sex,”
Justice Kavanaugh derived ordinary meaning of the phrase from
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. (citing New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 538–39 (2019)).
Id. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1741.
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Id.; see also FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 406 (2011).
Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
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common parlance and common legal usage of the phrase as a
whole. Justice Kavanaugh asserted that common parlance does
not support the majority because the plaintiffs would “probably
[ ] not tell their friends that they were fired because of their
sex.”122 In other words, the plaintiffs would not use the phrase
“discriminate because of sex” to describe what occurred to them.
Instead, the plaintiffs may have used the phrase “discriminate
because of sexual orientation (or gender identity).” Additionally,
historical context is important to determine meaning because it
provides insight into who is doing the speaking. The women’s
rights movement that prompted Title VII’s enactment “was not
(and is not) the gay rights movement.”123 Therefore, when Congress prohibited discrimination because of sex, it was doing so to
remedy discrimination against women. This reality should inform
how we read the operative phrase. Justice Kavanaugh then
turned to the wording of federal laws, executive orders, federal
regulations, state law, and Supreme Court precedent.124 In every
context, sex is treated as a distinct concept from sexual orientation.125 This is particularly important in the context of federal laws
because “the Court has often said, we ‘usually presume differences
in language’ convey ‘differences in meaning.’”126 We are once again
provided insight into who is doing the speaking—a Congress that
knows the difference between discrimination because of sexual orientation and discrimination because of sex—and this should inform the Court’s reading of the phrase. Justice Kavanaugh concluded that “all of the usual indicators of ordinary meaning . . .
overwhelmingly establish that sexual orientation discrimination is
distinct from, and not a form of, sex discrimination.”127
C. Semantics Versus Pragmatics
Justice Kavanaugh’s problem with the majority opinion was
that it strung together defined words to derive the meaning of an
entire phrase. Justice Kavanaugh argued that a determination of
ordinary meaning for a phrase must be done as a single unit, not
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Id. at 1828.
See id. at 1828–29.
124 See id. at 1829–33.
125 See id.
126 Bostock, 140 S. Ct at 1829 (quoting Wis. Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct.
2067, 2071 (2018)).
127 Id. at 1833.
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an aggregation of individual parts.128 If the individual parts cannot be used to define the entire phrase, then there must be a reference to the broader context of the statute. This is a battle between semantics and pragmatics. These terms have started to
enter the lexicon of the textualist community.129 But descriptive
and prescriptive analysis of where textualists come down on semantics or pragmatics is limited. This Comment serves to fill this
gap in textualist literature by examining textualist scholarship
and case law, reaching an inference in support of pragmatics.130
This inference certainly calls into question Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion. But this Comment continues to contribute to textualist
literature by recognizing that Bostock’s reliance on precedent is
an unmentioned but important distinction from the typical discussions regarding semantics. Ultimately, case law where textualists string together precedent-defined terms highlights a desire
to unify text and precedent, which suggests that textualism has
not abandoned semantics.
1. Semantics and the use of dictionaries.
Disparaging comments against the use of dictionaries call
into question the legitimacy of a semantics approach. When a
commentator or judge argues against a semantics approach, they
describe the practice as stringing together dictionary definitions.131 Justice Scalia captures the concern associated with
stringing together dictionary definitions when he says:
Adhering to the fair meaning of the text (the textualist’s
touchstone) does not limit one to the hyperliteral meaning of
each word in the text. In the words of Learned Hand: “a sterile literalism . . . loses sight of the forest for the trees.” The
full body of a text contains implications that can alter the literal meaning of individual words.132
Justice Scalia is not alone. Justice Kavanaugh’s dissent in
Bostock argued that a semantics approach may miss nuances that
128

Id. at 1826.
See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 68, 818–24 (defining and discussing the terms
“semantic meaning” and “pragmatic meaning”).
130 See, e.g., Zarda v. Altitude Express, Inc., 883 F.3d 100, 144 n.7 (2d Cir. 2018)
(Lynch, J., dissenting). But see Grove, supra note 51, at 303–07 (arguing that judges
should favor “formalistic textualism” because it protects the legitimacy of the judiciary).
131 See, e.g., Zarda, 883 F.3d at 144 n.7 (Lynch, J., dissenting).
132 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 356 (quoting N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Comm’r, 68 F.2d
19, 20 (2d Cir. 1933)) (emphasis in original).
129
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qualify the application of a phrase.133 And Chief Justice Roberts
has made a similar argument for reading words in context.134 This
still leaves two questions: First, how does a textualist justify the
increased use of dictionaries under a textualist judicial regime?
Second, what happens when a court faces a situation like in
Bostock? Supreme Court precedent has defined the words of the
phrase “discriminate because of sex” in the context of Title VII.
When considering a case brought under the same statute, would
a textualist find it reasonable to be able to prescribe an entirely
different rule with every permutation of words?
The Court’s practice suggests the role of dictionaries in determining ordinary meaning is unclear but potentially limited.
Although Justice Scalia had been explicitly against too strongly
adhering to dictionaries,135 the Court’s two main textualists of the
twenty-first century—Justice Scalia himself and Justice Clarence
Thomas—have used dictionaries the most.136 How does one justify
this high usage with Justice Scalia’s warning that dictionaries
and the literal meaning of words tend to lose the forest for the
trees? Is there a pattern in Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries that
can provide a guide for when to deviate from the dictionary? If
there is a pattern, it is not limited to using dictionaries to derive
a semantic meaning of a phrase; Justice Scalia has, on more than
one occasion, strung together dictionary definitions.137 However,
Justice Scalia rarely stopped at the meaning constructed after
stringing together dictionary definitions but instead proceeds to
review historical sources, relationships with other laws, or precedent.138 Although never stated, Justice Scalia’s practice suggests
that dictionary usage is a starting point to narrow potential definitions but there still needs to be more analysis to determine the
appropriate definition.139 This observation suggests that Justice

133 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1826 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); see also Manning, supra
note 42, at 2458; ESKRIDGE, supra note 22, at 62.
134 See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
135 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 534 (citing SCALIA & G ARNER , supra note 16,
at 419–24).
136 Kirchmeier & Thumma, supra note 51, at 86.
137 See, e.g., Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 31–32
(2003) (stringing together the dictionary definitions of “origin” and “goods”). For a list of
every time twenty-first century Justices have used a dictionary, see generally Kirchmeier
& Thumma, supra note 51.
138 See, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33–34 (reviewing precedent and the relationship between the Lanham Act and copyright law to support the semantic definition of “origin of
goods”).
139 See Kirchmeier & Thumma, supra note 51, at 123–24.
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Kavanaugh was correct when he said, “[i]f the usual evidence indicates that a statutory phrase bears an ordinary meaning different from the literal strung-together definitions of the individual
words in the phrase, we may not ignore or gloss over that discrepancy.”140 But this relegation of dictionary definitions to a class below “usual evidence” does not tell us if a semantics approach is
off-limits for a textualist when the units that are strung together
have more evidence to support that they represent the individual
unit’s ordinary meaning.
2. A hint of acceptance for semantics.
Although dictionary definitions have limited application,
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion complicates the legitimacy of semantics
because of its reliance on definitions derived from precedent.
Other commentators have supported or opposed Justice Gorsuch’s
opinion on the basis of its linguistic techniques.141 This Comment
makes the novel argument that missing from this analysis is a
discussion of the interaction of precedent and semantics. Judges
have long struggled to develop a unified theory of text and precedent.142 Justice Gorsuch’s stringing together of precedent-defined
terms—what I call a precedent-based-semantics approach—can
serve as a unifying methodology. This Comment shows that the
underdiscussed role of precedent may suggest that a semantics
argument reliant on the stringing together of precedent-defined
terms should be treated differently than a semantic argument
that is entirely reliant on dictionary definitions. Ultimately,
Part III.A suggests that the restraining power of precedent is
powerful enough to warrant a methodology that operationalizes
the precedent-based-semantics approach.
Bostock’s majority certainly starts with dictionary definitions
but ultimately relies on Supreme Court precedent that has previously defined the words “because of,” “discriminate,” and “individual” in Title VII. Indeed, precedent is one of the potential sources
of ordinary meaning that has served as a way to either buttress
or disregard the semantic meaning reached through the stringing
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Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1827 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
Compare Grove, supra note 51, at 303–07 (defending Gorsuch’s approach because
of its ability to promote judicial restraint), with id. at 283 n.108 (collecting criticisms of
Gorsuch’s opinion).
142 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 422 (1988) (discussing the problems with developing a theory
of precedent and historical attempts).
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together of dictionary definitions.143 However, this use of precedent is fundamentally different than in Bostock. Remember, the
Bostock majority engaged in a two-step process: finding ordinary
meaning and then applying ordinary meaning.144 Because semantics is a method to determine meaning and not implicated in step
two, when using a precedent-based-semantics approach we
should expect to see the use of precedent that engages with defining or articulating what the words of the statute mean.
Just because a case considered the application of a statutory
phrase does not mean that it explicitly defined the meaning of
said phrase. For example, the Court held in Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Services, Inc.145 that the ordinary meaning of the phrase
“discriminate because of sex” protected individuals from same-sex
sexual harassment. Similarly, in Bostock, the Court held that the
same phrase protected gay and transgender individuals from employment discrimination. These holdings do give a court some
sense of the ordinary meaning of the phrase “discriminate because of sex.” However, Bostock engaged in the preliminary step
of defining the ordinary public meaning of the phrase “discriminate because of sex,” establishing an understanding of the phrase
that can be used going forward and without reference to the facts
of Bostock. To determine the ordinary meaning of this phrase, the
Bostock Court committed to using precedent that explicitly defined the words of the statute. This commitment to precedentdefined words suggests that no precedent existed defining the entire phrase. Otherwise, we would expect the Court to have cited
that precedent and moved immediately to step two. Therefore,
assuming a commitment to precedent-defined words, stringing
together precedent-defined words is the best the Court can do.
Textualists on the Court have supported stringing together
precedent-defined words. A recent example predating Justice
Kavanaugh’s tenure on the Court is Justice Gorsuch’s opinion in
Wisconsin Central Ltd. v. United States.146 Three railroads challenged a tax levied against employee stock options.147 The

143 See, e.g., Dastar, 539 U.S. at 33–34 (using precedent to support a meaning reached
through stringing together dictionary definitions); Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F.2d 809, 811
(2d Cir. 1934) (using precedent to override a meaning reached through the stringing together of dictionary terms).
144 See supra Part II.A.
145 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
146 138 S. Ct. 2067 (2018).
147 Id. at 2070.

1444

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

language of the Railroad Retirement Tax Act148 was central to the
case—specifically, the phrase “money remuneration.”149 If the
phrase money remuneration was broad enough to encompass
stock options, then the three railroads would lose.150 To make this
determination, Justice Gorsuch first split up the phrase and
started the textual analysis with the dictionary definitions of
“money” and “remuneration.” As in Bostock, Justice Gorsuch supported the dictionary-defined term with precedent that clarified
the dictionary definition of the word “money.”151 There was no debate over the word “remuneration,”152 so Justice Gorsuch combined dictionary and precedent-defined meaning of “money” with
the accepted meaning for “remuneration” to create the ultimate
meaning of the phrase “money remuneration.”153 In the process of
arguing for the semantic meaning, Justice Gorsuch explicitly rejected the dissent’s attempt to use a literal meaning for the word
“money” that could encompass stock.154 While it might have been
true that there was a literal, dictionary definition for money that
could encompass stocks, precedent dictated that money had a narrower meaning.155 When this narrower meaning of money was
used to modify remuneration, stock options did not fall under the
ordinary meaning of money remuneration.156
Beyond the attempt at using literal meaning, the dissent
offered a surplusage argument, stating that the majority’s understanding of the phrase would render other parts of the statute
useless.157 Justice Kavanaugh offered a similar argument in his
Bostock dissent,158 but Justice Gorsuch rejected it in Bostock and
rejected it in Wisconsin Central too.159 Notably, Justice Thomas
and Justice Alito signed onto Justice Gorsuch’s Wisconsin Central
opinion.160
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26 U.S.C §§ 3201–41 (1937).
Id.
150 See id.
151 Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2071.
152 See id. at 2080 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[N]o one disputes that granting employees
stock options is a form of remuneration.”).
153 Id. at 2071 (majority opinion).
154 See id. at 2072.
155 Id. at 2071.
156 Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2075.
157 Id. at 2077–78 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
159 See id. at 1747 (majority opinion); Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2073.
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Another example can be found in Carcieri v. Salazar.161 This
case concerned the Court’s interpretation of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA).162 Under the IRA, the Secretary of the Interior
was authorized “to acquire land and hold it in trust ‘for the purpose of providing land for Indians.’” 163 Acting under the authority
of this statute, the Secretary of the Interior accepted into trust a
thirty-one-acre parcel for the benefit of the Narragansett Tribe.164
But the Court had to determine if the IRA’s definition of “Indian”
extended to the Narragansett Tribe. The IRA defined “Indian” to
“include all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction.”165
Whether the Secretary of the Interior was authorized to hold the
thirty-one-acre parcel in trust depended on the Court’s interpretation of the phrase “now under Federal jurisdiction.” 166 The
Narragansett Tribe was not under federal jurisdiction when the
statute was enacted.167 Therefore, the question became whether
the Secretary of the Interior’s authorization extended to Indian
tribes that were under federal jurisdiction when the trust was accepted.168 Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion and held
that authorization was in fact restricted to Indian tribes under
federal jurisdiction at the time of the statute’s enactment.169 The
Court’s other main textualist, Justice Scalia, joined the majority.170 The Court focused its analysis on the ordinary meaning of
the word “now.”171 To do so, Justice Thomas first relied on a dictionary definition of the word “now” and then Supreme Court
precedent of the usage of “now” in different statutes.172 The resulting meaning was then tacked onto “under Federal jurisdiction” to
determine the ordinary meaning of the phrase.
To be sure, neither opinion provides a definitive answer to
the import of stringing together precedent-defined terms. They
offer support for the use of a semantic meaning but both further
their argument with an examination of the “broader statutory
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172

555 U.S. 379 (2008).
See id. at 381–82.
Id. (quoting 25 U.S.C. § 465 (1934) (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5108)).
Id. at 385.
25 U.S.C. § 479 (currently codified at 25 U.S.C. § 5129).
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388.
See id. at 383–84.
See id. at 388.
Id. at 390–91.
Id. at 380.
Carcieri, 555 at 388–91.
Id. at 388–89.
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context”—a form of argument aligned with pragmatics.173 For example, in Wisconsin Central, Justice Gorsuch looked to a statute
under the same title that “expressly treated ‘money’ and ‘stock’ as
different things.”174 Congress’s explicit treatment of these two
words as different concepts created a presumption that these two
words have different meanings.175 Therefore, Justice Gorsuch provided additional support to the precedent-based-semantics meaning that indicated money remuneration did not extend to stock
options. (It is worth pointing out that Justice Kavanaugh made a
similar argument in his Bostock dissent.176) The precedent-basedsemantics approach can serve as a starting point. But are there
scenarios where a precedent-based-semantics meaning could and
should stand alone?177
The ultimate conclusion of this Section is that, although not
all textualists have uniformly endorsed either semantics or pragmatics, textualists view semantics—at the very least—as a valid
approach up until some undefined point. While textualists have
expressed concern with the semantics approach, when textualists
interpret statutes, they tend to engage in semantics as well as
pragmatics. This “do as I say, not as I do” approach is wanting
and suggests that the history of textualism does not determine
who is right between Justice Gorsuch and Justice Kavanaugh.
Similar to how dictionaries work with the meaning of individual
words, whether semantics should be abandoned for a pragmatics
approach may depend on a case-by-case basis.178
III. DETERMINING THE ORDINARY MEANING OF PHRASES: A
SLIDING SCALE BETWEEN SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS
It should be clear by this point that a textualist’s goal is to
find the ordinary meaning of a statute’s phrase. The problem is
that Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh offer two opposing ways to
find ordinary meaning—a semantics approach and a pragmatics
approach. This Part proposes a solution that uses a sliding-scale
approach to incorporate both semantics and pragmatics when
173

Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2071; see also Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 389–90.
Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2071.
175 Id. at 2071–72.
176 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1829 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (citing Wis. Cent. Ltd.,
138 S. Ct. at 2071).
177 See infra Part III.
178 See Kirchmeier & Thumma, supra note 51, at 128 (“The Court focuses on resolving
the issue presented in the case before it, using dictionaries where the individual Justices
find them instructive.”).
174
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finding ordinary meaning. My approach considers the restraining
power of precedent and uses the potential pool of precedent as the
metric to determine whether a semantics or pragmatics approach
is needed. The pool of precedent is said to increase when there is
variation in how precedent is defining the words of a phrase. As
the pool increases, the ability for a precedent-based-semantics approach to restrain a judge is weakened, creating a need to supplement it with pragmatics-based arguments. The sliding-scale
approach considers textualism’s two purposes of protecting the
rule of law and democratic accountability.179 But the approach
leans more on the principle that supports these two purposes—
judicial restraint.180
This Part proceeds as follows: With restraint as the lodestar,
Section A presents a novel solution of using a sliding-scale approach with the primary variable being the size of the pool of precedent. Section B presents additional justifications for why it is
important to have an approach that systematically incorporates
precedent, trading on the goals of textualism and its preference
for rules. Section C addresses the counterarguments that a truly
novel statute presents. Finally, Section D examines why other
means of determining ordinary meaning are suboptimal.
A. A Sliding-Scale Approach to Using Precedent, Semantics,
and Pragmatics
This Section seeks to present a novel solution that reconciles
the debate between semantics and pragmatics by creating a slidingscale approach that focuses on the restraining power of precedent.
A semantics approach maximizes the restraining power of precedent. The alternative to semantics would be using precedent to
reason backward to a sense of the ordinary meaning of a phrase.
For example, in Oncale, the Court interpreted “discriminate because of sex” to protect individuals from same-sex sexual harassment.181 The result in Oncale gives other courts some sense of the
ordinary meaning of the phrase, although there are many iterations of the ordinary meaning of the phrase that could lead to the
protection against same-sex sexual harassment. A court tasked
with finding the ordinary meaning of the phrase “discriminate because of sex” would have significant discretion to construct a

179
180
181

See supra Part II.B.
See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text.
See Oncale, 523 U.S. at 82.
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meaning aligned with precedent and also aligned with the judge’s
value-based preferences. A semantics approach to precedent,
however, constrains by focusing on precedent’s treatment of
words and not facts. “Because of” means but-for causation; that is
how precedent has defined the terms and a judge would have no
discretion on this matter. If the other words of the phrase also
have established precedent, then a judge using a precedentbased-semantics approach can find the ordinary meaning of the
phrase through a mechanical process devoid of discretion.
But when the pool of precedent is large, the precedent’s restraining power is diminished, and the need for a semantics approach goes with it. I suggest that a judge should still be willing
to utilize a precedent-based-semantics approach, but, as the restraining power of precedent wanes, a judge should support the
precedent-based-semantics approach with pragmatics-based arguments. The move to pragmatics is premised on a criticism of
dictionary definitions and other methods for deriving ordinary
meaning—too many options allow a judge to cherry-pick.182 The
argument is that if the pool of potential arguments is large
(i.e., there are many plausible dictionary definitions or interpretative canons), the judge is not restrained because she can choose
a definition or canon that is aligned with her political beliefs. The
restraint that the text provides is an illusion; instead, the text has
been bent to the judge’s will.183 Precedent-defined meaning, on the
other hand, is more difficult to cherry-pick. Precedent is similar
to dictionaries in that it defines words, but precedent is better at
clearly identifying the correct interpretation of a word in a statute. It is the goal of a judge to clearly articulate what a word
means in a statute. Also, there are few cases defining the original
meaning of a word in a statute, and they often reaffirm a meaning
that has been previously stated.184 Therefore, when precedent exists, it is like each word in a phrase has a single dictionary definition, decreasing the ability to cherry-pick. To be sure, if there
are many precedents providing many different definitions, we
would be back to square one. When we see this variation in how
precedent has defined the meaning of words, the size of the pool
of precedent can be considered large. When the pool is large,
182

See infra note 249 and accompanying text.
See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 545–51 (critiquing the idea that text, dictionaries,
and canons meaningfully restrain Justices).
184 See, e.g., Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 350 (2013) (citing
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009)).
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pragmatics plays a role. Recall Justice Scalia’s use of dictionaries
as a starting point.185 After establishing the meaning of a phrase
by combining words from the dictionary, Justice Scalia would
supplement his argument with an interrogation of the text and
its context. In effect, Justice Scalia would start with semantics
and then use pragmatics to support his semantics-based meaning. My sliding-scale approach requires a judge to do the same
thing when the pool of precedent is large enough that cherrypicking is not limited. When the restraining ability of a precedentbased-semantics method is limited, its purpose then becomes to
serve as a better starting point than dictionaries.
A problem with the sliding-scale approach is that a judge may
have discretion to determine when the pool of precedent is sufficiently large to move past the precedent-based-semantics meaning. As an attempt to limit this unwanted discretion, I propose
four discrete tiers to determine when a judge should support her
precedent-based-semantics meaning with pragmatics. To develop
these tiers, I use two considerations as proxies for the size of the
pool of precedent: (1) the court that created the precedent and
(2) the statute the precedent was interpreting. These proxies represent a commonsense approach to determine the size of the pool
of precedent. The Supreme Court hears a relatively small number
of cases a year, and even fewer Title VII cases. Accordingly, the
pool of precedent interpreting Title VII is small enough to alleviate concerns of cherry-picking. It is not necessary to consider
pragmatics-based arguments. However, there are ninety-four district courts hearing many thousands of cases a year.186 If a judge
must look to precedent from district courts to create a precedentbased-semantics meaning for a phrase, then her ability to cherrypick is quite significant. Therefore, it is necessary for a judge relying on district court precedent to support her argument with
pragmatics.
I explain and offer cases that fall into the four major tiers,
exemplifying how all courts might utilize my sliding-scale approach. I also make a more general suggestion about how the
lower courts could further apply my sliding scale. The four tiers
that apply to all courts are as followed: (1) Supreme Court precedent interpreting the words of the statute in question,
185

See supra notes 138–40 and accompanying text.
See Admin. Off. of the U.S. Cts., Federal Judicial Caseload Statistics 2020, U.S.
CTS. (Mar. 31, 2020), https://perma.cc/6HY3-CVE5 (finding 425,945 filings in the U.S. district courts as of March 2020).
186

1450

The University of Chicago Law Review

[88:6

(2) Supreme Court precedent defining similar words in other statutes, (3) courts other than the Supreme Court defining similar
words, and (4) truly novel statutes.
1. The highest tier: Supreme Court precedent defining the
words of the statute in question.
When there is Supreme Court precedent interpreting the
statute in question, the courts should rely fully on a precedentbased-semantics approach. The force of a meaning derived from a
precedent-based-semantics approach is strongest in these situations because the potential pool of precedent is likely small and
the arguments supporting statutory stare decisis are easily applied.187 The Supreme Court has determined the ordinary meaning of the words of the phrase. These definitions would be the law
of the land for the statute in question, and all courts will follow
suit. The result is little to no variation in how the individual
words of the statutory phrase are defined. This lack of variation
leaves little room to inject value judgments into the legal analysis, promoting the major goals of textualism. Therefore, a judge
adhering to a sliding-scale approach would follow Justice Gorsuch’s
path in Bostock and stop after using a precedent-based-semantics
approach.188 It is possible to present convincing alternative determinations of ordinary meaning based on hypothetical conversations with citizens from 1964 or inferences drawn from canons of
interpretation.189 But abandoning the precedent-based-semantics
approach in favor of a meaning that feels right provides greater
opportunity for value judgments to seep in, undermining the ultimate pursuits of textualism. However, Justice Gorsuch’s approach is not a perfect analog for this tier because of its initial
reliance on dictionary definitions. Using dictionary definitions is
not necessarily bad for the argument, but it does little to limit the
ability to cherry-pick.190
2. The middle tier: Supreme Court precedent defining
similar words in other statutes.
When a court must rely on Supreme Court precedent that interprets similar language in other statutes, it becomes necessary
187
188
189
190

See infra Part III.B.1.
See Bostock, 140 S Ct. at 1739–43.
See id. at 1828; infra notes 249–51 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.1.
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for the court to support the precedent-based-semantics approach
with minimal pragmatics-based arguments. Looking to Supreme
Court precedent interpreting the words of other statutes will increase variation in how the words are defined. The Supreme
Court’s definition of the word “quickly” in a financial statute will
differ from its definition of the word “quickly” in an environmental statute. Therefore, when a judge has the choice to rely on
either definition to construct her semantic meaning of a phrase
comprising “quickly,” the risk of cherry-picking is heightened.
That is why some pragmatics-based support is required.
Wisconsin Central and Carcieri exemplify the application of
this middle tier. In both cases, the Court used a precedent-basedsemantics approach where the precedent interpreted other statutes.191 The Court supplemented the precedent-based-semantics
meaning with an examination of the broader statutory context—
a limited application of pragmatics-based arguments.192 The continued reliance on precedent preserves predictability and uniformity, but there are more precedents to choose from when the
Court must turn to other statutes. The consequence is an increased ability to cherry-pick. The ability to cherry-pick decreases
restraint and means that semantics’ inability to capture all of the
nuances of the text becomes more difficult to justify. But both
cases show how the Court can mitigate this concern through a
reliance on the broader statutory context. This increased use of
the broader statutory context is the “slide” in the sliding-scale approach. Focusing on what the rest of the text can teach us starts
to move into the realm of pragmatics.
At this tier, courts should supplement precedent with additional pragmatic tools. Carcieri serves as an example of how a
judge should use the broader statutory context to support the
precedent-based-semantics meaning. To support the precedentdefined meaning of “now,” Justice Thomas looked to the use of
“now” in other parts of the text.193 Specifically, Justice Thomas
rejected the argument that “now” means “now and hereafter” because the statute has expressly used the phrase “now or hereafter.”194 It would be difficult to explain Congress’s use of “now”
alone to mean “now or hereafter” if other parts of the same statute
explicitly use “now or hereafter.” Looking at other parts of the
191
192
193
194

See Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2071; Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388–89.
See Wis. Cent. Ltd., 138 S. Ct. at 2071; Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 388–89.
Carcieri, 555 U.S. at 389–90.
Id.
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statute to determine the meaning of “now” is within the field of
pragmatics, but it is a fairly limited use. There is no reliance on
contemporaneous legislation. These sorts of techniques can enter
the discussion only when the pool of precedent is large enough
that cherry-picking is easy.
3. The lowest tier: courts other than the Supreme Court
defining similar words in other statutes.
When courts resort to lower court precedent to use a precedentbased-semantics approach, pragmatics-based arguments take on
a greater role in the analysis. There will be situations where there
is insufficient relevant Supreme Court precedent to construct a
semantic understanding of a phrase, but I argue that a court
should continue to rely on precedent. The court should look to how
other courts have interpreted the statute or similar language as
a starting point. Certainly, this is where judicial restraint is at its
weakest. The sheer number of courts defining the terms of statutes will create significant variation in how the terms are defined,
increasing the pool of precedent. The larger pool presents an opportunity to cherry-pick definitions to create an ordinary meaning—potentially leading to a value-based result. There will still
be minimal value attached to the uniformity and predictability
associated with the practice. To make up for the larger pool of
precedent, the judge will need to provide more pragmatics-based
evidence to buttress the precedent-plus-semantic meaning.
Justice Kagan’s dissent in Yates v. United States195 exemplifies the lowest tier and illustrates how to use precedent and semantics as a starting point for finding the ordinary meaning of a
phrase. (Justice Kagan’s dissent received support from textualists
Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas,196 and Justice Kavanaugh has
called the opinion “brilliant.”197) Yates was a commercial fisherman who caught undersized fish. “To prevent federal authorities
from confirming that he had harvested undersized fish, Yates ordered a crew member to toss the suspect catch into the sea.”198
Because of this action, Yates was charged and convicted under
§ 1519 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.199 Section 1519
195

574 U.S. 528 (2015).
Id. at 552 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
197 Kavanaugh, supra note 52, at 2161.
198 Yates, 574 U.S. at 531.
199 See id.; Pub L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C, 18 U.S.C., 28 U.S.C, and 29 U.S.C.).
196
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proscribes “knowingly alter[ing], destroy[ing], mutilate[ing], conceal[ing], cover[ing] up, falsif[ying], or mak[ing] a false entry in
any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation.”200 The case turned
on whether the interpretation of the phrase “tangible object” encompassed the abandoned fish in a statute that prohibits tampering with evidence.201 The plurality and the concurrence narrowed
the meaning of the phrase through the use of purpose-based arguments and interpretative canons.202 Justice Kagan granted to
the other opinions that “sometimes . . . the dictionary definition
of a disputed term cannot control. But this is not such an occasion,
for here the text and its context point the same way.”203 The
method that Justice Kagan used to determine the context of the
phrase is similar to Justice Gorsuch’s approach in Bostock, diverging with respect to the nature of the precedent—Justice
Kagan used state court precedent interpreting other statutes
while Justice Gorsuch used Supreme Court precedent interpreting the statute in question. The first step was finding the ordinary
meaning of “tangible object,” which is done through a dictionary
definition and an acknowledgment of state court precedent.204 The
next step was to look to the surrounding word “any.” Once again,
Justice Kagan started with the dictionary definition and then the
precedent.205 The word “any” expands the application of the phrase
“tangible object,” and ignoring this would ignore the ordinary
meaning of the text.206 This process resembles how Justice Gorsuch
tacks on the ordinary meaning of the word “individual” to the
phrase “discriminate because of sex” but with the opposite effect.
The word “any” expands the meaning of “tangible object” and the
word “individual” eliminates the possibility that the phrase “discriminate because of sex” calls for a group-based determination—
an important factor for the result of Bostock’s majority.207 To be
sure, it is not exactly parallel because the definition of “individual”
was not from precedent but solely from the dictionary.
Justice Kagan also advanced arguments that look outside the
surrounding text to determine the broader statutory context.
200
201
202
203
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18 U.S.C. § 1519.
See Yates, 574 U.S. at 536.
See id. at 539–42; id. at 549–51 (Alito, J., concurring).
Id. at 555 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
See id. at 553–55.
See id. at 555–56.
See Yates, 574 U.S. at 555–56 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1740–41.
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Some of these arguments cut against Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning.
Justice Kagan considered a hypothetical conversation with a
neighbor and asks whether a neighbor would consider a fish to be
a tangible object.208 Both Bostock dissents offered a similar argument when they presented the hypothetical that an ordinary citizen would disagree with the idea that “discriminate because of
sex” encompasses discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity.209 These hypothetical conversations tried
to consider context beyond what the words of the statute provide
and are seen as valid arguments in pragmatics. But this style of
argument should be resorted to only when the pool of precedent
is large. Therefore, under my sliding-scale approach, these arguments would not be effective against Justice Gorsuch’s reading of
the statute in Bostock.
4. A truly novel statute: pragmatics is the only option.
When there is no relevant precedent for a statute, pragmatics
should be a court’s only interpretative method. A precedentbased-semantics approach gets its restraint from the precedent.
Therefore, when we are left with only the semantics approach, we
are stringing together dictionary definitions. For the reasons expressed in Part II.B.1, this is a relatively poor option when compared to pragmatics. Therefore, semantics should be abandoned.
There still remains a question of what pragmatics-based arguments should be preferred. It may be necessary for a judge to carefully consider which of the alternative methods best promotes judicial restraint.210
5. How lower courts can apply the sliding scale.
A final consideration for my sliding-scale approach is to determine how the structure of our court system can create additional tiers that approximate the variation of precedent. In lower
courts, the focus remains on the balance between the benefits
associated with a limited pool of precedent and the need for
broader statutory context. How the sliding-scale approach may
apply in circuit courts will serve as an example. For these courts,
between the highest tier (situations where there is Supreme
208

See Yates, 574 U.S. at 567 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1767 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1828 (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
210 See infra Part III.D.
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Court precedent interpreting the words of a statute in question)
and the middle tier (where there is Supreme Court precedent interpreting other statutes) there is a tier where a circuit’s precedent interprets the statute in question. This situation arises when
the Supreme Court has not yet defined a word within a statute
but a circuit’s precedent has. Consider the “quickly” example with
the modification that it is the Seventh Circuit, rather than the
Supreme Court, interpreting a phrase in an immigration statute
that includes the word “quickly.” Also consider if there were Seventh Circuit precedent that had defined “quickly” in the context
of the same statute. Relying on the Seventh Circuit’s definition
would require less pragmatics-based support than relying on Supreme Court precedent defining other statutes. There would be
less variation in how the Seventh Circuit had defined the words
of the statute in question when compared to how the Supreme
Court had defined similar words in financial and environmental
statutes. The decreased variation would mean a lesser concern for
cherry-picking and a decreased need for broader statutory context.
For a similar reason, between the middle tier of Supreme
Court precedent interpreting other statutes and the lowest tier of
lower courts interpreting other statutes should be a tier of the
circuit’s precedent interpreting other statutes. Imagine if the Seventh Circuit were defining the ordinary meaning of a phrase in
an immigration statute that included the word “quickly” and looking to its own precedent defining the word “quickly” in other statutes. The variation in how the Seventh Circuit has defined the
word “quickly” in all other statutes would be less than the variation of how all other courts have defined the word “quickly” in all
other statutes. One could continue to break up the last tier into
multiple tiers: other circuits interpreting other statutes, district
courts interpreting other statutes, and state courts interpreting
other statutes. If doing so, one should focus, for each tier, on
how the size of the pool of precedent creates a need to consider
pragmatics-based arguments.
B. Further Justifications for a Sliding-Scale Approach
Beyond precedent’s commonsense ability to limit cherrypicking, there are further justifications for the sliding-scale approach and its attachment to precedent. I will start with drawing
a comparison to the arguments supporting statutory stare decisis—a “super-strong” presumption of correctness for statutory
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precedent211—and textualism’s goals. Then, I will explain how the
combination of this background and a semantics approach of constructing the meaning of phrases is aligned with textualism’s
preference for creating and adhering to rules.
1. The natural connection between precedent and
textualism.
Although textualism’s underlying principle is promoting judicial restraint, other goals associated with the doctrine are explicit
justifications for statutory stare decisis. “[S]tatutory precedents
are treated to a ‘super-strong’ presumption of correctness.”212 In
defense of this presumption, Justice Louis Brandeis famously
commented that “in most matters it is more important that the
applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”213
Professor Frank Horack similarly said that if the Court decides
to reverse its ruling on a statutory meaning, then “it is affirmatively changing an established rule of law under which society has
been operating.”214 This characterization highlights the importance of predictability and its effect on the rule of law. Horack
also states that the changing of the law—which now includes the
Court’s decision—is “explicitly and unquestionably the exercise of
a legislative function.”215
Despite the need to examine extratextual sources (i.e., precedent), “many textualists . . . still embrace statutory stare decisis.”216 Justice Hugo Black, a textualist, expressed similar separation-of-powers concerns with respect to overturning precedent
and was in favor of an absolutist approach.217 Although there is
debate on the extent to which statutory stare decisis should be
absolute, Justice Black’s basic theory has been influential.218 Despite a discomfort with judges serving as policymakers, Justice
Black recognized that “the resolution of statutory ambiguity

211 See Krishnakumar, supra note 20, at 165 (quoting William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1362 (1988)).
212 Id. at 165 (quoting Eskridge, supra note 211, at 1362).
213 Burnet v. Colo. Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
214 Frank E. Horack, Jr., Congressional Silence: A Tool of Judicial Supremacy, 25
TEX. L. REV. 247, 251 (1947).
215 Id.
216 Barrett, supra note 20, at 326.
217 See id. at 325–26 (citing Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398
U.S. 235, 256–58 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting)).
218 Id. at 326.
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inevitably requires some degree of policymaking.”219 However, he
argued that to deviate from the statutory precedent was to usurp
the legislature.220 As seen from all of Bostock’s opinions lodging
attacks against legislating from the bench, this fear is aligned
with textualism and has a similar motivation to textualism’s
faithful-agent goal.221 More recently, and providing a clear connection to textualism, then-Professor Amy Coney Barrett invoked
this separation-of-powers idea as a form of judicial restraint.222 All
of this is to show that an approach that attempts to recharacterize
the unit of linguistic analysis in order to ignore statutory precedent should be met with suspicion. To get around statutory stare
decisis is to miss the opportunity to internalize many of the goals
of textualism.
2. A preference for rules and its connection to a
pragmatics-plus-semantics approach.
Combining the benefits of a strict adherence to precedent
with a semantics approach furthers a textualist’s goal of judicial
restraint through a reliance on rules. When precedent exists, it is
as if each word in a phrase has a single dictionary definition.223 As
a consequence, a judge can reach an understanding of the text
without considering the exact problem facing the court.224
Whether this is a positive depends on where one comes down on
the rules versus standards debate. But there is a link between
textualism and rules.225 Although I have conceived of predictability as a corollary of judicial restraint, promoting predictability

219

Id. at 325.
See id. at 326.
221 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738; id. at 1754 (Alito, J., dissenting); id. at 1836–37
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
222 See Barrett, supra note 20, at 347–49.
223 See supra Part III.A.
224 See, e.g., Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1741 (“[A] straightforward rule emerges: An employer violates Title VII when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part
on sex.”).
225 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1183–85 (1989) (discussing a link between textualism and “general rules”). But see Easterbrook,
supra note 24, at 61 (“Meaning comes from the ring the words would have had to a skilled
user of words at the time, thinking about the same problem.”).
220
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can lead to judicial restraint too.226 Because rules provide greater
predictability, they can limit value judgments.227
Applying a precedent-based-semantics approach to a novel
Title VII context provides evidence of how it develops a rule. For
example, in a case examining the protections that Title VII affords to religion, the path to reaching the rule is clear. A judge
can examine the limited precedent interpreting “because of,” “discriminate,” and “individual” in the context of Title VII and reach
the straightforward rule that an employer violates the statute
when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part
on religion. The consequences of this rule on the case before the
court would be the basis of a judge’s argument. In a post-Bostock
world, the rule does not change. Maintaining the religion example, Justice Gorsuch’s rule resulting from the semantics approach
duplicates much of the work but adds the element that concepts
that are inextricably linked with religion must be encompassed
within Title VII’s religious protections. How a particular judge
feels about discrimination against religion, sex, or sexual orientation plays a more limited role because the judge cannot cherrypick a meaning of a statute that aligns with her values.
C. Addressing Novel Statutes
My resolution to rely on alternative methods when there is
no precedent reveals something important about my sliding-scale
approach—the source of restraint is derived more from precedent
than the words of the statute. Because precedent interpreting the
original meaning of words severely limits the ability to cherrypick, a judge that uses a precedent-based-semantics approach
successfully promotes textualism’s goals of judicial restraint, predictability, rule of law, and democratic accountability. But is this
judge being a textualist? As mentioned, “many textualists . . . still
embrace statutory stare decisis.”228 That does not mean that a textualist is comfortable using precedent when she does not have
to.229 In the case of a novel statutory phrase, there is in fact no on-

226 See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of Judicial
Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 275 (2005) (“[Judicial r]estraint in this sense simply
requires that the judge adhere to whatever method produces the most easily-predicted
results.”).
227 Scalia, supra note 225, at 1179–80.
228 Barrett, supra note 20, at 326.
229 See James R. Maxeiner, Scalia & Garner’s Reading Law: A Civil Law for the Age
of Statutes?, 6 J. CIV. L. STUD. 1, 11 (quoting SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 411)
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point precedent. Instead, a judge using the precedent-basedsemantics method would be going out of her way to use precedent
in pursuit of promoting the goals of textualism. It would not be a
stretch to say that precedent interpreting a statute is extratextual. Therefore, allowing such a precedent to be a preliminary
step would violate the idea that a clear text should not require
extratextual considerations.230 This returns the interpreter to ambiguity thresholds, potentially undoing all the restraint that the
precedent-based-semantics approach could offer.231
When the precedent that a judge is using to determine the
meaning of the individual words is from a nontextualist judge’s
opinion, a similar tension exists. The job of a textualist judge is to
“interpret[ ] a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning
of its terms at the time of its enactment.”232 But it is possible to
imagine that a nontextualist judge got the meaning of one of the
words in a phrase wrong. This can mean that the interpretation
is misaligned with the ordinary meaning at the time of enactment
or completely detached from the ordinary meaning of the terms.
If this occurs, should a textualist ignore the benefits associated
with precedent in favor of the process that defines textualism?
Dictionary usage is evidence that textualists are willing to
use extratextual sources to help determine the ordinary meaning
of the text, but evidence is limited on whether this willingness
extends to precedent defining terms. Judge Easterbrook has recognized both that precedent and the text are an “old pair” and the
importance of precedent to the legitimacy of court opinions.233 In
attempting to formulate this theory—admittedly, never reaching
a conclusion—Judge Easterbrook provides an unsatisfying answer that “precedent can be a destabilizing as well as a stabilizing
influence.”234 Judge Easterbrook does suggest that there is no
compelling reason to have weak constitutional stare decisis and
argues that it makes more sense for constitutional stare decisis
to have the same presumption of statutory stare decisis.235 Judge

(“Stare decisis . . . is not a part of textualism. It is an exception to textualism (as it is to
any theory of interpretation) born not of logic but of necessity.” (emphasis omitted)).
230 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1737 (“When the express terms of a statute give us one
answer and extratextual considerations suggest another, it’s no contest. Only the written
word is the law.”).
231 See supra Part II.C.1; supra Part III.A.1.
232 Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1738.
233 Easterbrook, supra note 142, at 422.
234 Id. at 433.
235 Id. at 426, 429.
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Easterbrook does not, though, state how strong the presumption
for stare decisis should be and doubts the adequacy of the rationales supporting a strong statutory stare decisis.236 Professor
Adrian Vermeule does argue for the super-strong presumption for
statutory stare decisis, suggesting that this rule would reduce
costs to the legal system.237 Although not connecting it with statutory stare decisis, Vermeule makes a similar argument for a
more textualist approach to judging.238 However, Justice Thomas
has taken an aggressive approach, expressing a willingness to
overturn wrongly decided precedent when interpreting the Constitution.239 Justice Thomas has also recently expressed willingness
to ignore statutory stare decisis.240 Professor Anita Krishnakumar
says that textualists of the “post-Scalia era” do not adhere to statutory stare decisis because of a presumption that there is a correct answer to interpretative questions, creating discomfort when
following a precedent that reaches the wrong answer.241 However,
the choice to overrule precedent increases discretion and the ability to inject value judgments, undermining the goals of textualism.242
D. Problems with the Alternative Methods for Finding
Ordinary Meaning
This Section assesses the relative restraining power of the alternative methods for finding ordinary meaning discussed in
Part III.C. Arguments regarding interpretative methodology are

236

Id.
Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 144–45 (2000) (arguing that strong statutory stare decisis decreases judicial decision costs and is more stabilizing than weak statutory stare decisis).
238 Id. at 139 (recognizing that there are potential increases in decision costs with
textualism but that the decision costs of legislative history are still theoretically greater).
239 See, e.g., Gamble v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 1960, 1984 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“When faced with a demonstrably erroneous precedent, my rule is simple: We
should not follow it.”).
240 See Krishnakumar, supra note 20, at 211 n.203 (“Justice Thomas joined thirteen
of seventeen Roberts Court opinions advocating overruling a statutory precedent (and authored ten of them).”).
241 Id. at 204–05. Despite the broad label of “textualists of the ‘post-Scalia era,’” Professor Krishnakumar’s data ends in 2015 and does not include Justice Gorsuch’s or Justice
Kavanaugh’s time on the Court. Id. at 228–33.
242 Cf. William Baude, Precedent and Discretion, 2019 SUP. CT. REV. 313, 329–30
(2019) (“[D]iscretionary features render precedent worse than useless. They make it a
tool for evading other requirements of the law, and a threat to certain aspects of judicial
neutrality.”).
237
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centered around relative measures.243 As such, arguing in favor of
my solution requires an examination of how effectively alternative methods restrain judges. Because my solution does fully rely
on pragmatics when interpreting a truly novel statute, this Section also selects the alternative method that is best at restraining
judges.
Justice Kavanaugh’s best-reading approach and its open application of the absurdity doctrine244 create the same conditions
for value-based judgments that it aims to solve. The Court has
said that the absurdity doctrine dictates that “a court’s obligation
to the text ceas[es] when ‘the absurdity and injustice of applying
the provision to the case, would be so monstrous, that all mankind
would, without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.’”245
Professor John Manning, a prominent textualist scholar, argues
that the absurdity doctrine is flawed because it does not provide
judges an “intelligible basis on which to set aside clear textual
commands in favor of likely legislative intent.”246 Similar to the
problems that Justice Kavanaugh raises against ambiguity, it is
not clear what makes a statute absurd and what level of absurdity should trigger the absurdity doctrine’s application.247 This
missing “intelligible basis” serves to open the door for value-based
judgments. Manning does relent on throwing out the absurdity
doctrine entirely, arguing that the baseline meaning to consider
when using the absurdity doctrine is not the literal meaning but
a meaning that relies on context.248 My goal is to determine what
considerations are appropriate when considering the context and
the resulting ordinary meaning, so I am back to square one.
Justice Scalia’s approach, which relies on canons of interpretation, also does little to restrain judges from making value-based

243 See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 23, at 551 (criticizing Scalia’s “canons-based textualism” for being “a relatively less constraining approach” than the use of “legislative
materials”).
244 See Kavanaugh, supra note 52, at 2144 (noting that the best-reading approach allows judges to use the absurdity doctrine to “justify departure from the text”).
245 Manning, supra note 42, at 2387–88 (quoting Sturges v. Crowinshield, 17 U.S.
(Wheat 8.) 122, 203 (1819)); see also SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 235 (“What the
rule of absurdity seeks to do is what all rules of interpretation seek to do: make sense of
the text.” (emphasis in original)).
246 Manning, supra note 42, at 2454–55.
247 See supra notes 52–54 and accompanying text. But see SCALIA & GARNER, supra
note 16, at 388 (arguing that a judge may consult legislative history to find at least one
“rational legislator” who interprets the statute to mean what the present court considers
an absurd result; if this legislator exists, then the statute is not absurd).
248 Manning, supra note 42, at 2461–64.
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judgments. The criticism lodged against dictionaries has been
that “there are so many of them and each offers a variety of definitions for common terms,” so judges can cherry-pick a definition
and are left unrestrained to make value-based arguments.249
When a judge is able to make a value-based judgment, predictability is lost, and the rule of law suffers. The existence of fiftyseven canons, which Justice Scalia and Professor Bryan Garner
suggest might be only one-third of the total “valid canons,” presents a similar issue.250 When there are too many approaches to
choose from, a judge can cherry-pick the canons that work best to
support their value judgment. When this possibility exists, predictability suffers, and the purposes of textualism are not met.251
Corpus linguistics is not free from problems that should give
pause for anyone committed to finding ordinary meaning. The
first problem is fundamental. Corpus linguistics has a tendency
to reach the “prototypical” meaning and not the ordinary meaning.252 This means that the meaning corpus linguistics provides
will be too narrow.253 Supporters of corpus linguistics find this
concern to be overstated.254 Corpus linguistics does more than give
just the most common meaning of the word. Instead, it provides
the relative frequency of multiple meanings. Whether ordinary
meaning equates to the prototypical meaning or encompasses
senses that are lower down the list is a question of law.255 This
response, however, sheds light on the second problem with corpus
linguistics—it is an effective tool to find ordinary meaning but
does not necessarily constrain judges. The relative frequency that
equates to ordinary meaning is up to the judge. Similarly,
whether the types of considerations—semantic, pragmatic, and
time period—are applicable is up to the judge’s discretion.256
Although precedent is likely the best limit on cherry-picking,
corpus linguistics may be the appropriate approach when there is

249

See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 534.
See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 16, at 9.
251 See Eskridge, supra note 23, at 544 (discussing problems with cherry-picking
among canons).
252 Tobia, supra note 44, at 761 (showing that corpus tracks “prototypical” definitions
better than “technical[ ]” definitions).
253 See id. at 795–97 (detailing several “fallacies” that are common in arguments from
corpus linguistics but tend to produce narrow meanings of terms).
254 See Lee & Mouritsen, supra note 68, at 874.
255 See id. at 874–75.
256 See id. at 866 (“[Judges] should not . . . overlook the potential for subjectivity or
even strategic manipulation [when using corpus linguistics].”).
250
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no precedent.257 The absurdity doctrine or an ambiguity threshold
have two unknowns that leave room for value-based judgments—
what makes something ambiguous or absurd and how much is too
much. Corpus linguistics still requires a determination of how
much is enough to equate to ordinary meaning, but a judge has
the metric of relative frequency. Plus, the empirical nature of corpus linguistics restrains by “facilitat[ing] transparency and scrutiny.”258 Judges being better able to check the work of other judges
incentivizes against cherry-picking considerations that allow for
a particular, ideological result.
CONCLUSION
Regardless of a judge’s selected school of statutory interpretation, the text is always the starting place for a judge trying to
apply a law. But the increasing prominence of textualism has emphasized the importance of carefully finding the original meaning
of the statute’s text. This commonsense approach is an attractive
means to maintain the legitimacy of the Court. Forcing a judge to
be restrained by words on the page promotes predictability, further promoting the preservation of the rule of law and democratic
accountability. However, the concept of ordinary meaning is itself
elusive. Bostock exemplifies the consequence of this problem.
Three justices claiming to be adhering to the ordinary meaning of
the phrase “discriminate because of sex” go about finding the ordinary meaning of the phrase in three different ways. The end
result is a majority that held that Title VII protects gay and
transgender individuals and two dissents that felt that the Court
had usurped the legislature. Going forward, a resolution of who
is correct—or most correct—will benefit textualism and the general predictability of judges who adhere to the philosophy.
With textualism’s goal of judicial restraint in mind, this Comment offers a novel sliding-scale approach that reconciles Justice
Gorsuch’s and Justice Kavanaugh’s absolutist positions. Piecing
together the meaning of terms derived from precedent offers
fewer opportunities to cherry-pick than alternative methods for
finding ordinary meaning and comports with a textualist’s preference for rules. This is particularly true when the Supreme
Court has interpreted the words in the statute in question. But

257 See id. at 867 (“The potential for subjectivity and arbitrariness is not heightened
but reduced by the use of corpus linguistics.”).
258 Id. at 868.
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this sort of precedent may not always exist. The ability of a judge
to cherry-pick increases when she must rely on precedent interpreting other statutes than the one in question. To counteract this
decrease in restraint, the meaning that the precedent-plus-semantic
approach provided requires more support. A judge can offer this
support with an examination of the broader statutory context (i.e.,
looking to pragmatics-based arguments). This need for support further increases when relying on precedent from other courts. When
a court encounters a truly novel statute, it then becomes appropriate to consider alternative methods that incorporate pragmatics. If
judges choose to follow my sliding-scale approach, then they will be
engaging in a method that actively seeks to restrain judges. This
will, in turn, benefit textualism’s underlying goals of predictability,
rule of law, and democratic accountability.

